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Abstract
The phenomenon of the “popularization” of journalism has become widespread in the process of 
media marketization, globalization and digitalization. This phenomenon has been studied mostly in 
the Anglo-American context. This article instead draws attention to China, where the tendency 
toward popularizing (party) journalism is also occurring but taking a rather different form. It 
focuses on the case of Xinhua News Agency—the pioneer as well as the most representative 
case of traditional party journalism in the country. The article considers to what extent Xinhua’s 
online media content concerning the ruling party since 1949—the Communist Party of China—
has been popularized both in terms of content and style. The changes to online media content 
made by Xinhua are indicative of the extent to which it is possible to combine the status of a 
state-owned central news organization with a new journalistic orientation that seeks to make the 
messages from and about the party more appealing to technology-savvy and entertainment-driven 
audiences in the new media environment in mainland China.
Keywords
Chinese journalism, journalism transformations, party journalism, popular journalism, Xinhua 
News Agency
Introduction
On 21 June 2017, a story issued by the Xinhua News Agency hit the headlines online in mainland 
China. What made Xinhua suddenly “popular” was a short news item about Saudi Arabia released 
by the agency that day via WeChat, the Chinese equivalent to WhatsApp. Within 10 minutes of 
releasing the story online, it had been read, reposted and commented on over 100,000 times.1 The 
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whole news item, including its title “刚刚，沙特王储被废了,” which literally means in English 
“Just now, Saudi’s crown prince has been fired,” consisted of only 38 Chinese characters. What 
captured its readers’ attention was not just the story itself, but also what appeared to many Xinhua’s 
“excessive use of labour” in editing such a short story. Three editors in total were involved in the 
production and the release of the news story, sharing its authorship. While some readers in their 
comments half-jokingly criticized Xinhua for being “capricious” (任性), others praised the news 
agency for being “meticulous” (严谨). To some WeChat users’ surprise, they not only received 
immediate replies from Xinhua’s editors on their comments, but also found the editors’ responses 
“unusual.” For example, in responding to one reader’s comment questioning the use of three edi-
tors to complete this nine-word-only title, one editor replied, “王朝负责刚刚，关开亮负责被
废，陈子夏负责沙特王储，有意见？？？.” His reply literally means: “Wang Chao (an editor’s 
name) is responsible for “just now,” Guan Kailiang for “has been fired”; Chen Zixia for “Saudi’s 
crown prince.” Do you have any [different] opinion [on our division of work]?” This half-joking 
reply, which is very different from the traditional “Xinhua style” (新华体), perceived mostly as 
formal top-down propaganda (Lv & Chen, 2015), served to stimulate the discussion of Xinhua’s 
story online. As such, the interactions between Xinhua editors and audiences had turned this short 
piece of international news into a type of “popular text” identified by John Fiske in his famous 
study of Western popular culture and mass media, conducted about three decades ago (Fiske, 
1989a, p. 117). Consequently, the “popular text” produced by Xinhua, together with the response 
of its online audience, boosted the popularity of its WeChat public account in mainland China.2
Although the success of the news story was largely accidental, the case itself exemplifies how 
China’s traditional central news organizations like Xinhua are eager to use popular social media 
platforms such as WeChat to promote their news services to the world’s largest online population. 
This is particularly true when Chinese Internet users are increasingly turning to sources other than 
Xinhua and similar state-owned media outlets, for news and information. This is worrying not only 
for Xinhua and other central media organizations, but also for the Communist Party of China 
(CPC)—the country’s ruling party since 1949 (Xin, 2017; Zhao, 2013). It is worth noting that the 
CPC’s revolutionary ideology used to be rather effective in motivating journalists and cultural 
workers to make their symbolic work well-liked by the masses when the party was based in Yan’an 
and other rural areas which it controlled in the 1940s (Liu, 1997; Xin, 2012; Zhao, 1998). Nowadays, 
however, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the party-controlled media, such as Xinhua, to 
gain the same degree of popularity, either online or offline, that they once enjoyed (Xin, 2017; 
Zhao, 2013). In circumstances such as those described above, Xinhua was able to succeed in 
attracting a sizable audience online, though not necessarily for the reasons that the news agency 
had originally contemplated. However, as noted by some online readers in their comments on 
Xinhua’s story, this case, though eye-catching, cannot be seen as a typical example of Xinhua’s 
party journalism practices as it did not concern the CPC. Departing from this particular case, this 
article explores to what extent Xinhua has managed to popularized its core party journalism con-
tent, especially in terms of handling topics concerning the party and its policies. In comparison 
with international news reporting, Xinhua’s handling of the coverage of the party in general should, 
at least in theory, be more representative of China’s party journalism practice.
This issue is also closely linked with a broader debate around the transformations undergone by 
Chinese journalism since the early 1980s: to what extent is popular journalism compatible with 
traditional party journalism in China? Some scholars suggest that market-oriented popular journal-
ism aiming to meet audience needs is inevitably in tension with party-oriented official journalism’s 
propaganda function (Goldman, 1994; Hsiao & Yang, 1990; Lee, 2000). However, research on the 
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transformations of the Chinese press since the 1980s, including a more recent study focusing spe-
cifically on China Youth Daily, illustrates that traditional party organs have tried to combine both 
roles, and their news portfolios are now leaning toward the more popular end of China’s journalism 
in order to be able to survive (Lee, He, & Huang, 2006; Li, 1998; Wang, Sparks, & Huang, 2017; 
Zhao, 1998, 2008).
It is also worth noting at this point that, of course, the rise of popular journalism is not unique 
to China. In fact, it has arguably become a global phenomenon (Thussu, 2008). Its wider impact on 
society has been extensively debated in liberal democratic societies since at least the mid-1990s 
(Thussu, 2008). The studies carried out in the Chinese context have focused mainly on newspapers 
(Lee et al., 2006; Li, 1998; Wang et al., 2017; Zhao, 1998). Hence, this article draws on the rela-
tively understudied case of Xinhua, the pioneer as well as a representative case of China’s party 
journalism (Xin, 2012). The origin of Xinhua’s party journalism can be traced back to the early 
1930s. As one of the most influential news organizations in mainland China, Xinhua has ever since 
played a key role in setting the general tone for other media in covering politically sensitive issues 
concerning the country and the party (Xin, 2012). This makes Xinhua a highly relevant and suita-
ble case for this study.
This paper consists of five main sections besides the introduction. The first two sections set up 
the theoretical framework within which this study is situated. The third section explains the method 
employed for collecting primary data. The fourth section presents the main research findings gen-
erated from a contextual analysis of two examples selected from Xinhua’s recent online media 
productions. The final section draws some conclusions.
What makes journalism “popular” in the Western context?
Although China’s party journalism does have a revolutionary legacy in relation to the rural masses 
and folk culture in the 1940s, the current tendency toward popularizing online media content and 
adopting styles borrowed from Western popular culture in order to cater for the needs of younger 
generations needs to be understood in a broader context (Liu, 1997; Xin, 2012; Zhao, 1998, 2008). 
The emergence of the latter phenomenon in today’s China has surely been partly, if not entirely, 
driven by the country’s unprecedented process of marketization, urbanization and integration into 
the global capitalist system since the early 1980s. While it is worth examining the phenomenon 
from a national and historical perspective, a theoretical comparison with the rise of popular jour-
nalism in other parts of the world is also necessary. The literature review section of the article thus 
starts by reviewing some ground-breaking studies carried out by Western scholars.
In the Western context, defined in a broad sense, the notion of popular in relation to culture and 
mass communications has been variously defined (Story, 2015). Raymond Williams (1983: 237), 
for instance, argues, based on a study of the history of British press, that the “popular” entails four 
different meanings: In an older sense, popular means “inferior kinds of work” and “work deliber-
ately setting out to win favour”; in a more modern sense popular refers to work being “well-liked 
by many people” or to “culture actually made by the people for themselves.” The main problem 
with the existing definitions of the popular, as John Storey (2015) suggests, lies not so much in the 
lack of theoretical agreement on the concept of “popular” itself, but mostly in the seemingly taken-
for-granted quantitative approach to its operationalization. On the one hand, the “popular” of popu-
lar culture/journalism needs to be justified by including a quantitative dimension of the 
conceptualization. On the other, relying too much on a quantitative methodology offers little clari-
fication about the nature of popular culture but instead generates meaningless figures (Storey, 
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2015). Bearing Story’s methodological concern in mind, this study draws attention specifically to 
those pieces of research which are helpful for generating a more nuanced approach to understand-
ing popular journalism in general and its contemporary practice in China in particular.
Historically, the term “popular” emerged in early discussions about European elites’ concerns 
over the masses, who were also referred to as “ordinary people” or “craftsmen and peasants” 
(Burke, 2009, p. xiii). The popular was traditionally seen by the elites as “a generalized threat to 
order and civilization” (Sparks, 1992, p. 25). The “popular” was later put forward by the left in 
opposition to the term “the working class” (Sparks, 1992, p. 25). In both cases, it seems natural to 
argue that popular culture and journalism must necessarily contradict each other. Colin Sparks 
(1992) elaborates,
In order to be “popular” at all, it [popular journalism] must have some contact with the lives of the masses 
in a society, but the popular is not, and never can be, a “socialist” term. At the very best, it may be a term 
which mobilizes a certain ill-defined discontent with the existing structure of society. At its worst, of 
course, it has been a term put to most barbarous usages. We would thus expect to find that while popular 
journalism would speak in an idiom recognizable by the masses as more or less related to their own, it 
would only speak of their concerns, joys and discontents within the limits set for it by the existing structures 
of society. (p. 28)
Here, the contradiction between popular culture and journalism is seen as an inevitable outcome 
of the objective social reality (Sparks, 1992). For Stuart Hall (1981, p. 238), such a contradiction 
is not class-based but exists between “the people” and “the power-bloc.” Hall (1981) argues, “The 
people versus the power-bloc: this, rather than ‘class-against-class’, is the central line of contradic-
tion around which the terrain of culture is polarized” (p. 238). For Hall, the power-bloc refers to an 
alliance of the dominating forces, including the media (Fiske, 1992; Hall, 1981). Although sections 
of the media might from time to time act as a check on or even criticize the government over cer-
tain issues, the media as a whole must still be seen as part of the power-bloc since disputes between 
the media and the rest of the power-bloc are usually confined to limited actions (Fiske, 1992). 
Moreover, the contradiction between the people and the power-bloc, as suggested by Hall, serves 
as an importance source of popular culture/media, which in turn neutralizes the conflict caused by 
the contradiction (Hall, 1981). According to Hall, both the left and the right should be able to 
articulate with the notion of the popular for their own political ends. Hall’s view is based on his 
observation of British politics in the 1980s (Hall, 1981, 1988; Sparks, 1992).
When it comes to the question of what constitutes popular journalism in a liberal democracy, the 
discussion often takes a different direction. Popular journalism is generally seen as a relative con-
cept, “defined in contrast to what is seen as ‘quality journalism’” (Sparks, 1992, pp. 38-39). In 
comparison with quality journalism, popular journalism tends to give more space to “human inter-
est” stories than to stories about political and economic lives (Sparks, 1992). In general, popular 
journalism concentrates on the “immediate issues of daily life” over “those concerns traditionally 
ascribed to the ‘public sphere’,” thus its news structure is “massively and systematically ‘depoliti-
cised’” (Sparks, 1992, p. 39). In other words, the “political” is often replaced by the “personal.” 
The popular conception of the personal,” as Sparks clarifies, is usually used as “the explanatory 
framework within which the social order is presented as transparent” (Sparks, 1992, p. 40). Within 
the framework, the question “what happened” becomes irrelevant in a popular news story. Instead, 
it asks a rather different question: what happened to certain groups of people? (Sparks, 1992). In 
this way, the main subject of a popular news story has been ultimately personalized.
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Hall (1981, p. 227) defines the approach to personalizing news subjects by creating documen-
tary effects as “popular naturalism.” For him, this approach might be persuasive from the audi-
ence’s perspective but the subsequent consequences of using it are worrying. Hall (1981) 
elaborates,
 . . . within this field of “popular naturalism,” the primacy of the visual element has contributed both to 
growth in our ability to document and visualize accurately, and to a persuasive or false presentation of 
ordinary people and “real” life. (p. 227)
According to Hall (1981), it is particularly problematic when popular naturalism and documen-
tary effects are employed altogether “not as modes of communication with their own strengths and 
limitations but as ways of giving the communicators an easier passage into the mind of an audi-
ence” (p. 228).
In contrast to Hall’s concerns with the negative effects of popular journalism, some scholars 
are more positive about the encroaching of popular culture into the field of journalism. John 
Fiske is one of the leading figures in this camp. Fiske (1989a, p. 21) argues that popular culture 
is “potentially, and often actually, progressive (though not radical)” as well as “essentially opti-
mistic.” He suggests that popular culture involves an “active process of generating and circulat-
ing meaning and pleasures within a social system,” which is a subjective process in nature 
(Fiske, 1989a, p. 23). Fiske (1989a, p. 142) also argues that “popular culture” should be concep-
tualized as “a productive process.” During this process, the people or “popular readers” tend to 
conduct “selective and spasmodic” readings (Fiske, 1989a, p. 143). They select certain texts 
only and turn them into popular texts, which can be sensational, obvious, excessive and/or cli-
chéd (Fiske, 1989a, p. 117). To make a text popular, it “must have points of relevance to a variety 
of readers in a variety of social contexts” (Fiske, 1989a, p. 141). The best approach to analyzing 
popular texts, Fiske (1989a) suggests, is “to investigate what traditional critics ignore or deni-
grate in popular texts” (p. 106).
In comparison with Hall and Sparks’s views, Fiske’s (1989a, 1989b) approach to popular jour-
nalism places emphasis on readers’ engagement with the process of manufacturing popular cultural 
products, such as soap opera and popular news. In order to make news popular, Fiske (1992) sug-
gests that news should borrow from soap operas. This means that rather than promoting “a final 
truth,” popular news should “provoke discussion (like soap opera) or disagreement (like sport-
casting) (Fiske, 1989b, p. 195). In addition, popular news in general and TV news in particular 
“must meet the key criteria of popular taste, those of relevance and pleasurable productivity” 
(Fiske, 1989b, p. 185).
In terms of relevance, it is mostly “a matter of content, as the experiences of the viewer’s life 
are matched to those represented in the text” (Fiske, 1989b, p. 186). There are different levels of 
cultural relevance in operation, which can be roughly divided into the macro, the middle and the 
micro levels. Of the three, the micro level of relevance, which makes connection between the text 
and the readers’ everyday lives, is the most important one for motivating people to watch TV news 
or read a newspaper story (Fiske, 1989b). In some respects, Fiske’s notion of “popular relevance” 
is similar to Hall’s concept of “popular naturalism,” though Fiske considers the relationship 
between popular culture and journalism in a much more positive light than Hall.
As for the issue of “popular productivity,” Fiske does not define it directly (Fiske, 1989b, p. 
185). He argues that if relevance “can be sought through context,” productivity of popular culture 
is “more a matter of form” (Fiske, 1989b, p. 190). In order to enhance the relevance of news 
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content as well as to make the form of news pleasurable to watch, oralization of news is essential. 
In other words, popular news should be essentially oral and easy to bring up in everyday conversa-
tions. As Fiske (1989b) points out, the “more formally open and internally interrogatory television 
is, the more it will be talked about” (p. 192).
Fiske (1989b) also tries to differentiate popular news from all kinds of propaganda. He warns 
that serving “the socio-political interests of any set of social forces” will risk “failing to meet the 
two criteria of the popular—relevance and productivity” (Fiske, 1989b, p. 197). However, Fiske 
does not offer practical solutions to prevent popular news production from becoming vulnerable to 
external hegemonic influences of the “power bloc.”
Fiske’s view on popular culture and journalism has also been extended to studies of politics, 
entertainment and citizenship in liberal democratic societies (see van Zoonen, 2005). Liesbet van 
Zoonen (2005) among others has discussed the tendency for politicians to act as celebrities, some-
times referred to as “popularizing politicians.” Yet, van Zoonen’s (2005) work on the populariza-
tion of politics is outside the scope of this study, which is concerned with the popularization of 
China’s online party journalism. Some of the key conceptual and analytical categories of popular 
journalism proposed by Hall, Fiske and Sparks will be employed for analyzing Xinhua’s online 
journalistic output. The following three aspects are particularly relevant to this study: Fiske’s rel-
evance or Sparks’s personalization of news, Fiske’s popular productivity, and the oralization real-
ized by using less formal/oral expressions. Before applying these criteria to the case of Xinhua, the 
following section will briefly discuss the relevance of the notion of popular journalism in the 
Chinese context.
The relevance of popular journalism in the Chinese context
Popular journalism in the Western sense emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in mainland 
China as a result of media marketization (Zhao, 1998). The divide between quality and popular 
journalism in mainland China has never been as a clear cut as it is, for example, in the United 
Kingdom or Germany (Wang et al., 2017). A distinction can be made between China’s traditional 
party journalism/party-oriented media and market-oriented media (Xin, 2006; Zhao, 1998). 
However, such a dichotomy has been questioned recently since, the argument goes, it no longer 
accurately reflects the greater variety of Chinese news media outlets brought about by media mar-
ketization, globalization and digitalization over the past decades (Wang et al., 2017). Thus, a more 
nuanced classification seems necessary.
Strictly speaking, as the only ruling party, the CPC currently owns all news media in main-
land China, though the vast majority of them are no longer fully funded by the party-state’s 
subsidies (Zhao, 2008). In this sense, the type of journalism that China’s news media as a whole 
practises on a daily basis remains formally “party journalism.” All China’s news media outlets, 
both party-oriented and market-oriented, have to follow the party’s ideological directions, no 
matter what formats and styles they adopt. Meanwhile, the political, economic and social costs 
for not obeying the “Party line” remain high (Zhao, 1998, 2008). However, this does not mean 
that there are no differences in content and style among China’s news media outlets. In fact, 
there has been a diversification of news media outlets across all media platforms since the early 
1980s, especially since 1992, as an outcome of the ongoing media transformations in China 
(Xin, 2012; Zhao, 1998, 2008). A less formal type of party journalism, focussing on human-
interest stories as well as various forms of entertainment has emerged in the Chinese press, on 
television, in radio as well as online. This “popularized” genre of Chinese journalism has been 
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described as either “popular journalism with Chinese characteristics” (Li, 1998, p. 307) or “pop-
ular official media” (Wang et al., 2017, p. 1). According to Wang, Sparks and Huang, “popular 
official media,” namely central state media such as China Youth Daily, tend to present “the party 
and business elite in a human light and thus constitutes a renewal of the repertoire of hegemonic 
devices at the party’s disposal” (Wang et al., 2017, p. 1). Fundamentally, however, the “popular-
ized” genre of Chinese journalism is still a type of party journalism. Or more accurately, it is a 
popularized version of party journalism.
Along with other party-owned news organizations, Xinhua historically aimed to simultaneously 
serve the party and “the people,” even though the notion of “the people” in the Chinese context has 
constantly changed (Xin, 2006, 2012). Treating “the people” as news consumers is a recent devel-
opment in Chinese media marketization (Xin, 2006). For Xinhua, a traditional news agency, it was 
difficult to reach readers directly, especially in the pre-Internet age, as the majority of the state 
news agency’s news subscribers/clients were media outlets and institutions (Xin, 2012). In the new 
digital environment, individual users are able to access Xinhua’s news directly online, mostly via 
mobile devices. In theory, this has created a new opportunity for Xinhua to serve “the people.” In 
this context, Xinhua has in recent years expanded its online news and information services, which 
can now be accessed via Xinhuanet.com along with various mobile news apps (Song, 2013). In 
addition, in late 2012, Xinhua set up a new division producing and marketing online-only media 
content (Song, 2013). It aims to target over 730 million Internet users in the country, the vast 
majority of whom are under 39 and often go online via smart phones (China Internet Network 
Information Center [CNNIC], 2017). Xinhua’s online output tends to be more market-oriented, 
especially in comparison with Xinhua’s traditional wire news (Lv & Chen, 2015). The introduction 
of a direct-to-people online news service is part of Xinhua’s efforts to adapt to the rapidly changing 
news environment in China where the Internet and social media platforms play an increasingly 
important role in audiences’ media consumption. For a leading central news organization like 
Xinhua, the effort to make news coverage more popular online is not only a response to business 
and journalistic incentives but also a political task, in the context of China’s hegemonic battle for 
winning “hearts and minds,” both at home and abroad (Xin, 2017; Zhao, 2013). In particular, the 
CPC is concerned that it may lose the attention of younger generations in the new digital environ-
ment unless messages about the party and from the party are delivered in styles that are more 
appealing to them (Xin, 2017). There is thus a sense of urgency and necessity behind the adoption 
of more popular styles and forms by outlets practicing China’s traditional party journalism. In this 
sense, the modification of China’s party journalism toward popularization should be seen as “pro-
gressive” or evolutionary rather than as a “radical” change, similar to the ways in which Fiske 
(1989a, pp. 160-161) has described the nature of popular culture.
The research design
In order to address the above research aims, a qualitative contextual analysis of Xinhua’s online 
media content was employed as the main method of data analysis. Fiske’s (1989a, p. 108) approach 
to reading popular texts emphasizes “contextuality,” which derives from “the unique relations of 
this particular linguistic use to this particular contextual moment.” The contextual reading is useful 
in handling the “transient and impermanent” type of subtle changes made to the media content and 
presentation (Fiske, 1989a, p. 108).
For this contextual analysis, two well-known examples of Xinhua’s online media output were 
chosen. The first case is a video clip, known as “新华社神曲” (translated literally into English as 
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“Xinhua’s ‘Divine Tune’”). The second case is a short film called The Red Temperament (or 红色
气质). They cover two of the most popular topics of party-oriented journalism: the Divine Tune 
case concerns the party’s policy, specifically the top party leader Xi Jinping’s “Four comprehen-
sives” policy; the “The Red Temperament” short film is about the revolutionary history of the CPC. 
Each example is analyzed by reference to the criteria of popular journalism discussed earlier, 
namely: (1) the criterion of relevance/personalization of news, (2) the criterion of popular produc-
tivity, and (3) the criterion of oralization. In addition, the use of compact formats, as exemplified 
by Xinhua’s short piece about Saudi Arabia, for online circulation via social media will be used as 
a supplementary criterion for assessing Xinhua’s online output.
In order to understand the main considerations behind Xinhua’s production of the two media 
items, the producers’ notes were also analyzed. Partial notes were published in Xinhua’s internal 
journal Journalism Practice Weekly. Additional information was accessed through publicly avail-
able interviews with the Xinhua journalists involved in the production of the two pieces. The pro-
ducers’ notes provide contextual information about how the original ideas about the two pieces 
were pitched, developed and realized.
Since this study is exploratory in nature, any findings generated from it are only indicative of 
the current trend of the Chinese journalism in general and Xinhua’s online media content in par-
ticular. While it cannot make any generalizations, its research findings are likely to apply broadly 
to other central news media organizations that are representative of traditional party journalism, 
such as the People’s Daily, China Central Television, China Daily, Guangmin Daily and China 
Radio International. In ways, which are similar to Xinhua, these organizations have all begun to 
popularize their online party journalism content via popular social media platforms (Liu & Wang, 
2017). Future research could fruitfully compare the popularization strategies of these organizations 
in order to identify similarities as well as differences.
A contextual analysis of Xinhua’s online media content
“Four comprehensives”3
This 3-minute video recites Xi Jinping’s political slogans, first proclaimed in a speech given during 
an official visit to Jiangsu province in December 2014 (Guo, 2014). The slogans are derived from 
Xi’s famous political philosophy—the so-called “Four comprehensives” (or “Si Ge Qan Mian” 四
个全面 in Mandarin). The “Four comprehensives” refer to Xi’s calls on all party members to
Comprehensively build a moderately prosperous society (全面建成小康社会); Comprehensively deepen 
reform (全面深化改革); Comprehensively govern the nation according to law (全面依法治国); 
Comprehensively strictly govern the Party (全面从严治党).
This video aims to promote Xi’s “Four comprehensives” among the younger generation of 
Chinese audiences online. It seeks to do so by adopting a new strategy, described by a senior editor 
sarcastically but effectively as “洗脑＋卖萌.” This means literally a strategy combining the tech-
niques of “brainwashing” (洗脑) and “deliberately acting cute” (卖萌) (Qian & Li, 2016). The 
strategy has arguably worked effectively in recent years in the realms of advertising, public rela-
tions and political communication in China (Qian & Li, 2016).
The choice of a suitable format for the video was a paramount consideration for Xinhua’s edito-
rial team (Qian & Li, 2016). They believed that a more popular format would make a difference in 
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attracting younger viewers when it came to covering a traditional “party journalism” topic like Xi’s 
policy. An animated cartoon immediately became their favorite choice: animation is considered 
one of the most popular formats of Chinese journalism in the age of social media, especially among 
younger viewers (Qian & Li, 2016). There are well-known examples of animated cartoons designed 
to promote the government’s policies, most notably a cartoon on China’s 13th Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social Development (Qian & Li, 2016). They provided a model for Xinhua’s edito-
rial team behind the “Four comprehensives” video. The next important issue for Xinhua producers 
to tackle was how to give the topic a personal angle in order to make it more relevant to younger 
audiences’ everyday lives. Personalization is an important component in the wider strategy to 
popularize party journalism in China.
For this purpose, Xinhua’s cartoon portrays two main characters: an unidentified young female 
figure in a red dress and an anonymous adult male figure wearing a pair of black framed glasses. 
Both characters are given clear gender and social roles: the girl is curious about Xi’s policy but not 
shy in spite of her ignorance; the man, who seems more knowledgeable, offers to help her and 
patiently explains in vernacular what the “Four comprehensives” stand for. The video also employs 
one of the common “brainwashing” strategies in advertising—the repetitive use of key words taken 
from Xi’s policy directly in the lyrics of a rap song (Qian & Li, 2016). The interactions between 
the two main characters are depicted as them “having fun together” in spite of their differences in 
gender, age, education and social background. This can be seen as a reversal of the way in which 
Xinhua used to send out the formal top-down messages from and about the party.
The video is intentionally constructed to attract younger viewers. It opens with the male figure 
singing a rap song, turning the short phrase “Four comprehensives” into a counting rhyme in rap 
music. This makes the female character curious about what he is singing. Her question is not 
answered directly. When the man responds, “have you heard of the ‘Four comprehensives?’” the 
girl hesitantly replies, “[are they] about the Chinese dream or something like that?” In this way, the 
opening scene manages to create an informal tone for the video, carefully avoiding sounding like 
the male figure is talking on behalf of the party and forcing his audience to listen to him. This 
approach is also quite different from Xinhua’s traditional party journalism, which is often per-
ceived as dull preaching delivered by Xinhua on behalf of the party (Lv & Chen, 2015). The open-
ing scene is also an implicit recognition that young people know little about the “Four 
comprehensives” and might find it difficult to relate them to Xi’s “Chinese dream.” To ensure that 
the video resonated with younger audiences, Xinhua’s production team included the target audi-
ence’s peers, young producers born in the 1980s and 1990s (Li, 2016a). Their comments and sug-
gestions were taken seriously in the planning and production of the video (Li, 2016a). This 
“referring down” effort was often highlighted by Xinhua’s producers in their reflections on the 
reasons for the success of the video.
Arguably, the source of the video’s “popular productivity” mainly derives from letting the two 
cartoon characters “deliberately act cute” in speech and action, which might look a bit excessive and 
unnatural to a non-Chinese audience. In China, however, “deliberately acting cute” has become not 
only socially acceptable in recent years, but also highly regarded in public and media discourses and 
does not carry negative connotations. As a news strategy, the “deliberately acting cute” method 
works particularly well in circumstances in which the news topic is serious, mostly concerning poli-
tics. In this sense, the “卖萌” method intends to create an effect similar to the “personalisation of 
news” brought about by the tabloid format of journalism in the Anglo-American context.
In order to be able to act cute, both cartoon characters in the video are singing and dancing 
together to rap music, only briefly toward the end of the video joining a crowd to sing 
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Beethoven’s Ode to Joy together. The combined use of rap and classical music in the video 
results in a certain degree of contradiction, which, according to Fiske’s reading, is also a typical 
feature of popular culture (Fiske, 1989b). Yet, the main objective of the cartoon is, of course, 
not to provoke its audiences or make them feel uncomfortable about Xi’s policy. Rather, the 
cartoon aims to promote Xi’s policy as well as inform young people about it despite its ele-
ments of popular culture.
However, the use of the fictional cartoon characters somehow fails to generate the type of popu-
lar productivity created in a documentary, for example. The kind of popular productivity produced 
by documentaries, according to Hall (1981, p. 227), is closer to “popular naturalism” than fictional 
content. Documentaries tend to be more effective in shaping and reshaping audiences’ perception 
of social reality. Conversely, this implies that the choice of animated cartoons, while succeeding in 
appealing to young audiences, was not as effective as the choice of a non-fictional format of popu-
lar journalism in generating an effect of trustworthiness in the target audience. For Xinhua’s pro-
ducers, however, the trade-off between the two formats and their differential impact on a target 
audience’s perceptions were not a major concern. They were more concerned with finding a way 
of creating a message that could appeal to younger audiences in order to win their support for Xi’s 
policy.
In such circumstances, oralizing the text in order to make it more accessible for its younger 
audiences was equally crucial for the purpose of personalization. In explaining what 
“Comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society” means in the Chinese context, the 
rap song in the video first proposes a conceptual connection between the “moderately prosperous 
society” and everybody’s dream. Since the concept of dream remains vague, the video then 
makes a more relatable connection between the “moderately prosperous society” and people’s 
everyday lives. Vernacular expressions instead of the written text of traditional Xinhua style are 
used to illustrate what daily life for ordinary people should look like in a “moderately prosperous 
society.” Life in a “moderately prosperous society” is described in the video as: “We will not feel 
stressed [by the money issue] as we have [enough] money in our hands.” The use of We is 
intended to denote an inclusive society. Meanwhile, the cartoon subtly divides “Us” from an 
unspecified “Them,” implying that building a “moderately prosperous society” remains a 
national project in China. In addition, the video envisages that in a “moderately prosperous 
society” environmental concerns, especially the worrisome air pollution, will be resolved even-
tually. Environmental problems, corruption and other social problems are framed not as an open 
criticism of the government but as urgent issues that the country is tackling under Xi’s leadership 
and that will eventually be solved. As such, the video has inherited from traditional party jour-
nalism the “positive/constructive” approach to reporting social problems plaguing contemporary 
Chinese society.
In order to reach younger viewers via social media platforms, the cartoon is kept as short as 
possible, being just over 3 minutes long (Li, 2016a). To cater to the taste of its younger audiences, 
the video ends by displaying some (positive) comments from its viewers, making them look like 
the live-streaming moving subtitles in the famous danmaku style of online games. These efforts 
illustrate how much Xinhua values the amplifying effects of social media sharing as it seeks to 
popularize its traditional party journalism output.
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“The red temperament”4
This 9.5-minute film was produced in 2016 as part of the CPC’s 95th anniversary. Similar to the 
cartoon, the short film also targets China’s younger generations, particularly those who were born 
in the 1980s and 1990s. It was first released online, mostly via Xinhua’s client terminal apps, and 
also offline, shown on outdoor big screens. Later, the film was made available on over 3000 web-
sites and apps and attracted over 200 million viewers in total.5
Instead of using the cartoon’s “brainwashing” and “deliberately acting cute” approach, the film 
adopts documentary storytelling techniques, aiming to be able to “走心,” which literally implies 
“to take [audience’s] heart away.” The major concern of the editorial team was to draw younger 
viewers’ attention to the film without making them feel as if they were the target of traditional party 
propaganda (Li, 2016b).
The style of the opening scene is an example of Hall’s (1981, p. 227) “popular naturalism.” The 
opening was clearly designed to demonstrate relevance, exemplified by the connection made 
between the main subject of the film and its target audience. There are obvious references to the 
link between the CPC’s revolutionary past and a real person’s life. The main character is Ms Qu 
Duyi (瞿独伊), who was born in the same year as the CPC. The film starts with Ms Qu singing 
“The Internationale” in Russian without musical accompaniment. Who is she? Why is she singing 
“The Internationale”? Why in Russian? Having prompted these questions, the voice over in the 
following sequence of the film offers some background information about Ms Qu’s life in relation 
to the song as well as to the party’s history. The former Editor-in-Chief of Xinhua’s Moscow 
Bureau, Ms Qu was the only daughter of Mr Qu Qiubai (瞿秋白)—a famous leader of the CPC in 
the late 1920s. Once a photo of Mr Qu appears on the screen, more information about the heroic 
figure is provided, including about his death, as he was killed by the government led by the 
Kuomingdang (国民党) in 1937. The central narrative that the film endeavors to construct around 
Mr Qu’s death via the voiceover is a portrait of a young father, walking slowly and with dignity 
toward the execution field while singing the Chinese version of “The Internationale” translated by 
himself. According to Ms Qu, who was 14 when her father died, she could barely make the con-
nection between her father, looking like a frail intellectual in the photo, and a revolutionary party 
leader being brutally killed. Ms Qu’s comments on her father are another reminder to the audience 
that the CPC’s history is not just about the party itself and those heroic figures like Mr Qu Qiubai. 
It is equally relevant to Ms Qu, as an individual. In the same way, as the film subtly implies, the 
party’s history could be relevant to every viewer of the film too. Underneath such a personalized 
but patriotic narration of the party’s revolutionary past deployed throughout the film, the party’s 
traditional ideological values, such as motivating party members to sacrifice their personal lives 
for the collective interest, represented by the CPC, can also be easily read.
The most obvious difference between this film and Xinhua’s traditional party journalism is the 
way in which a hero like Mr Qu is portrayed. The documentary’s strategy is to portray a hero as a 
common man instead of portraying a common man as a great hero, as in earlier films (Lu, 1997). 
This approach has also been applied to the narrative constructed around another well-known fig-
ure, Mr Jiao Yulu (焦裕禄). Alongside a brief introduction to Mr Jiao’s dedication to his political 
career as a local CPC leader in the 1950s, Red Temperament deliberately directs the audience’s 
attention to his less well-known hobby of playing the erhu, a traditional Chinese musical instru-
ment. This is to illustrate that Mr Jiao was a common man too, who shared a common man’s inter-
est in music. This “common man-narrative” is, again, quite different from how Mr Jiao used to be 
portrayed by traditional party media as an idealized symbol of the most loyal party cadre in the 
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1960s (Lu, 1997). To complete Mr Jiao’s common man portrait, the film also highlights his fami-
ly’s regret, possibly his own too, for missing the opportunity to take a family portrait (全家福) due 
to his very busy work schedule. Again, this serves the purpose of personalization via creating 
“documentary effects” or the effect of “popular naturalism,” as identified by Hall (1981, p. 227).
In terms of style, the film is characterized by the extensive use of digital visual aids. Xinhua’s 
archive photos were transformed into moving images and in this way contributed to the creation of 
“popular productivity.” In one scene of the film Mr Jiao “joins” the rest of his family in a “virtual” 
photo, thus allowing the family to “realize” their dream of having a family portrait. Similar effects 
are deployed in other parts of the film. According to the General Producer (Li, 2016b), they were 
purposely employed to create powerful cinematic effects, visually appealing and emotionally 
touching. However, pursuing such a “surreal” visual effect unavoidably risks compromising the 
trustworthiness created by “popular naturalism” (Hall, 1981, p. 227). The latter is seen as arguably 
one of the most essential elements that make news and current affairs popular according to Hall 
(1981). Nevertheless, the adoption of special digital features does enhance the productivity of the 
film, as defined in Fiske’s reading of popular culture/news (Fiske, 1989a, 1989b). In fact, the film’s 
special effects became a popular subject of conversations between the film producers and the film’s 
audiences after the film was released.
The language used in the film’s voice over is mostly plain and accessible. An “unpolished” 
voice from a senior journalist, instead of a well-trained TV presenter, was chosen for the voice 
over. In comparison with traditional party journalism practiced by Xinhua (see Xin, 2012), the 
general linguistic style of the film is less formal. However, it is much more formal than the 
cartoon. For example, the film cites a famous political slogan, “The Country is the People (江
山就是人民), the People is the Country (人民就是江山)” from Mr Xi Zhongxun, who was a 
former leader of the CPC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the father of Xi 
Jinping. Without offering further background information about the slogan, especially how it 
is related to Xi’s “Four comprehensives” policy, the use of the slogan creates some ambiguity 
about the major theme of the film, in particular regarding the definition of “the people.” In this 
sense, the film is closer to the traditional style of party journalism than the cartoon.
However, it can be seen that there is a delicate balance between being “too ideological” and 
being “not ideological” enough. As a result of this balancing act, certain editorial compromises had 
to be made, including revealing the main purpose of the film at the end of the movie rather than at 
the beginning (Li, 2016b). According to the youngest member of the production team, doing oth-
erwise would have been perceived as being “too propagandistic” by his peers born in the 1990s (Li, 
2016b). His suggestion convinced Xinhua’s senior editors and thus was accepted in the editing of 
the film (Li, 2016b).
In general, the film portrays the party’s history in a very positive light. Similar to other Chinese 
mainstream films, the “Red Temperament” equally promotes the “mainstream melody” (主旋律) 
— the revolutionary past of the party and its role in guiding the Chinese people through the “miser-
able past” toward today’s prosperity. Apart from a brief phrase referring to the so-called “Great 
Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976) as “Ten Years of Great Disaster,” the film refrains from saying 
anything negative about the Party’s history. Instead, it depicts a wholly positive image of the party, 
in a personalized and visually impressive narrative style. In this respect, the personalization strat-
egy was key to making the content of the film as relevant as possible to the target audience. In a 
way, which resembles the cartoon, the film also adopts the traditional “positive/constructive” 
approach to the reporting of problems encountered by the party throughout its history, 
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demonstrating more continuities than discontinuities with Xinhua’s journalistic output in terms of 
covering issues concerning the party’s past.
Finally, the film, like the cartoon, also adopts a compact format, aiming to tell the party’s 
95-year-history within 9.5 minutes, in order to make it more amenable to sharing via social media 
platforms (Li, 2016b).
Conclusion and discussion
The above analysis has shown that in order to appeal to a particular part of the audience—the 
younger generations of Chinese—both the cartoon on Xi’s “Four Comprehensives” and the docu-
mentary film The Red Temperament have employed forms of contemporary popular culture suita-
ble for online circulation via social and digital media platforms. In comparison with Xinhua’s 
international news story on Saudi Arabia mentioned at the beginning of the article, these two 
examples are clearly different in terms of news strategies and the journalistic style they adopt.
Using the key criteria of popular journalism, namely personalization, popular productivity and 
oralization, these two cases show how Xinhua, the pioneer as well as the most representative case 
of China’s traditional party journalism, is trying to popularize its online media output about the party 
in the new media environment. Meanwhile, Xinhua’s efforts to popularize its online output have not 
changed the nature of the journalism that is practiced by Xinhua on a daily basis. It is worth noting 
that Xinhua’s editorial modifications, such as taking younger journalists’ opinions more seriously, 
have indeed created a valuable space for further editorial negotiations and new experiments. 
However, how big this space can become still largely depends on the party’s guidelines.
It can also be seen that promoting the party’s policies and ideologies via social and digital media 
has become part of Xinhua’s routine practice. The goals informing Xinhua’s online and social media 
practice are consistent with the state news agency’s traditional role as a party organ. They are also in 
keeping with its ideological function, which, of course, predates the Internet and social media. The 
case of Xinhua shows that popular journalism is compatible with traditional party journalism in 
China and that the latter can be easily adapted to a more popular form of journalism, borrowing from 
the conventions and genres of (Western) popular culture, such as rap music (originating in the United 
States). In this sense, the journalism practiced by Xinhua is indicative of the extent to which it is pos-
sible to combine the status of traditional party organ with a new journalistic orientation that seeks to 
create messages from and about the party that can be appealing to younger Chinese audiences and 
that reach them through the online and social media channels to which they are increasingly turning. 
Further research should investigate how Chinese young people perceive this popularized type of 
online party journalism produced by Xinhua and other central news organizations.
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